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The objective of this project is to research and analyze the consequences of 
deploying an end item system consisting of a myriad of components that have warfighter 
utility outside of the Force Provider (FP) system design.  The analysis will address: the 
inherent challenges associated with accountability of the FP System when deployed and 
decommissioned to undergo RESET; the lack of a singular management and decision-
making authority to control the system from production through deployment; and the 
financial implications that occur when the integrity of the FP System is lost due to re-
distribution of major components throughout the battlefield. As a result of this project, 
the FP product office, Army leadership and the using organizations will all understand 
the necessity to maintain complete accountability and integrity of the FP System 
throughout its deployment and decommissioning cycle.  This may also result in decisions 
that could minimize the financial burden to the Army due to components that are lost to 
operational commanders who decide to keep some FP components, which must be 
reprocured for RESET.  
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This Joint Applied Project examines the accountability challenges faced by the 
Army when deploying and redeploying a personnel support package of modularized 
equipment, known as Force Provider (FP), in support of both military and humanitarian 
operations.  The Force Provider systems and components are designed to provide 
billeting, laundry, shower, food and latrine services to deployed personnel.  A more 
detailed description of FP is provided later in the research project.   
This project evaluates the FP deployment sequence. It begins with the initial 
transfer of equipment from War Reserve storage to the operational users, and continues 
analysis through redeployment, RESET (conducting maintenance and replacing missing 
or unserviceable components), and return to War Reserve.  The analysis determines 
whether the existing Army rules and procedures for property accountability are effective 
with the FP property concept, and whether FP using organizations are effectively 
implementing accountability guidance. In addition, the analysis determines whether the 
FP property accountability design impacts the Army goal to maintain total asset visibility 
(TAV) of the major subcomponents.  Finally, the analysis considers whether FP 
deployment and accountability practices result in a financial burden and equipment loss 
to the Army.  This effort is undertaken to produce recommendations for future FP System 
deployments, including the enforcement of an acceptable accountability process.  In 
addition, conclusions and recommendations may also provide insights for significant FP 
RESET cost avoidance because enhanced accountability may reduce FP component 
reprocurement.   
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This Joint Applied Project explores the deployment, operation, redeployment, and 
RESET of the FP system. It identifies the successes, failures and challenges of 
accounting for the system in each of these phases.  The study focuses on After Action 
Reviews (AARs), published articles on past deployments, Army accountability 
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regulations requiring asset management and TAV, historical RESET cost growth trends, 
and programmatic impacts to effectively managing the FP life cycle.  Finally, 
recommendations based on the analysis are made to ensure the FP system accountability 
process is sufficiently robust to be implemented with each future deployment of the 
system. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
• What are existing U.S. Army property accountability rules and 
procedures concerning the Force Provider property system, and 
how is accountability guidance communicated to and complied 
with FP-using organizations?   
2. Subsidiary Questions 
• To what extent is Force Provider (FP) a system of systems (SoS), 
and how effective are accountability procedures in terms of 
accomplishing accountability goals and adapting to changing 
environmental factors? 
• How does not accounting for FP items at the component level 
affect the FP system? 
• How is FP ownership described and operationalized? 
• What is the financial impact of losing FP components to 
operational commanders? 
• How are FP utilization decisions described and operationalized 
when deployed? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The study included three phases: 1) Review of all pertinent data on the FP system 
design, mission and use, 2) Analysis of both the current accountability process and the 
high cost of accountability failures, 3) Recommendations on the appropriate 
accountability procedures necessary to maintain total system accountability, from 
deployment through redeployment. 
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E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I introduces the research topic. Chapter II provides background 
information on FP, which includes the mission, definition of FP, employment strategy, 
ownership of FP when deployed, components of the system, de-processing requirements, 
and efforts undertaken to RESET the system to full operational condition.  Chapter III 
provides data on the accountability process, the financial impacts of current 
accountability practices, lessons learned from technical assistance team (TAT) visits to 
the area of responsibility (AOR), findings on who can make utilization decisions for FP 
when deployed, and the resulting damage to the Army equipment posture when 
component accountability fails.  Chapter IV provides an analysis of the data discussed in 
Chapter III, as well as conclusions and recommendations designed to ensure total system 
accountability throughout the FP deployment process. 
F. EXPECTED BENEFITS  
This project identifies and recommends appropriate actions for the accountability 
of the FP system. This effort will serve as either a validation to the current accountability 
practices or as an indicator of potential problems that may continue to hamper the ability 
of the Army to account effectively for the FP system. Additionally, if problem areas do 
exist, the recommendations offered will enable the systems developers and life cycle 
managers to make the necessary adjustments or corrections to ensure successful 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. ARMY FORCE PROVIDER (FP) SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
The U.S. Army Force Provider (FP) system is a War Reserve asset created after 
Operations Desert Shield/Storm (1991) to modernize defense personnel field living 
conditions.  Previously, there was a marked disparity between how the Army and Air 
Force personnel lived in field conditions.  For example, although collocated in the same 
camp — Camp Eagle in Saudi Arabia — a 12-foot wall separated Army and Air Force 
personnel.  The former lived in predominantly non-air conditioned, cotton-style Bedouin 
tents, and showered in hastily built facilities open to the elements, including plywood 
latrines with 55-gallon drum cutouts.  On the other side of the wall, Air Force personnel 
rested in climate-controlled tents with better-built and enclosed showers and latrines.       
To improve soldiers’ living conditions in austere environments, and to resolve the 
inequity described above, the Army Chief of Staff (General Gordon Sullivan) directed 
development of a containerized, deployable capability.  Since deployment in 1994, 
accountability issues emerged, so supply accountability procedures and inventory 
requirements were implemented to ensure visibility of system components during and 
after deployment. The following sections describe the main components and processes of 
the FP system:  Mission/mandate guidance; Components; Operational user employment 
strategies, Accountability and ownership requirements: and Deprocessing and return 
processes including actions to RESET the system. 
1. Force Provider Mission and Mission-Creep 
The overarching Force Provider (FP) mission is to support the rest and refit 
(R&R) of defense personnel living and operating in field and overseas conflict zones.  
The system was designed to provide a relatively full spectrum of life-support capability 
for 600 occupants, including living quarters, showers, laundry and meals.  It is generally 
accepted knowledge that the FP system experienced early and sustained “mission-creep,” 
revealed by the following indicators:  (1) Systems used as reception points for personnel 
entering a theater of operations;  (2)  Systems used as intermediate staging bases for units 
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transitioning to operational areas;  (3) Systems served as temp-facilities supporting 
natural disaster relief efforts;  (4) Systems used to support humanitarian operations per 
military command authority; and (5) Systems used as redeployment facilities to house 
and process soldiers prior to boarding aircraft for return to CONUS.  Surprisingly, even 
with mission accumulation/fragmentation, the overall mission appears to have remained 
relatively stable. 
Instead of deploying the entire system (600-person camp), FP components can be 
selected separately and shipped overseas on an as-needed, component basis, e.g., showers 
only, or laundries, or billeting and kitchen components only.   
In 2007, the possibility of making the FP system more expeditionary was 
evaluated to augment Army efforts in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), particularly in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Expeditionary in this context refers to the following:  the ability to 
rapidly deploy and employ capability to an operational area without the increased burden 
of requiring a significant support structure to execute the move as would be required with 
the current FP system design.  Overall capability to support 600 soldiers has remained 
constant.  Expeditionary efforts and employment strategy are discussed later in this 
chapter.   
2. Force Provider Defined 
The FP system has been defined in many ways.  FP is basically a “city in a box” 
because the system is packed in a series of containers that, when unpacked and placed 
into an operating configuration, provide food, shelter and housing.  The “modular” aspect 
of the system ensures across-system connectivity, including the ability to increase 
systems and support more than the 600-person base camp.  It is also being described as a 
System of Systems (SoS) because it is made up of a myriad of interrelated components 
that work together to provide a larger overall capability. 
The Product Management Office responsible for delivering the FP system from 
production is Product Manager Force Sustainment Systems, Natick Massachusetts.  The 
FP system, as articulated by that office is, in essence, a small city.  It is categorized as the 
“Army’s Premier Base Camp designed to provide the total infrastructure and life-support 
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capabilities necessary to support a contingent of 600 occupants.”  Force Provider is a 
compilation of military and commercial products and contains all the materiel necessary 
to provide climate-controlled billeting, quality food and dining facilities, hygiene 
services, and Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) facilities to the occupants.  When 
deployed, it can be operated by either a military unit or a civilian service contractor.  
Force Provider comes complete with water and fuel storage, a power generation and 
distribution system, and a wastewater collection and storage system.  Force Provider is 
containerized and preconfigured, facilitating movement by any combination of land, air 
and sea transportation.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Force Provider Base Camp 
 
3. Components of Force Provider 
Each FP system with accompanying kits contains about 38,000 items and is an 
integrated collection of major and subcomponents (laundries, showers, latrines and dining 
facilities), including thousands of individual pieces (plumbing, cables, tents, bunk beds 
etc.) packed into 119 triple containers (TRICON) and ten International Organization for 
Standardization  (ISO) containers.  Each major subcomponent provides stand-alone 
functionality and, if required, the components can be deployed independently versus 
deploying the entire system.  Each FP container requires a forklift to offload and place 
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components in their respective camp locations.  The two primary add-ons are the cold 
weather kits and the prime power kits.  The cold weather kit provides additional heating 
capability into the billeting, administrative and MWR facilities when operating at 
temperatures below 32 degrees Fahrenheit.  The prime power kit is designed to connect 
to a host nation power source and minimizes the need to rely on the many tactical 
generators that would otherwise be used to provide electricity to the camp.   The chart 
below highlights capabilities of each major FP component. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Force Provider Major Subsystems 
 
4. Employment Strategy 
FP can be transported to required locations by land, sea or air.  Once the 
designated area of operations (AO) is identified, the ground commander requests FP 
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system deployment through the Army G3 office by completing a mission needs statement 
(MNS).  The requirement is transferred to the Army G4 who then issues deployment 
guidance to the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Natick Integrated Logistics 
Support Center (ILSC).  The Natick ILSC prepares the transportation documents. If the 
system is to be deployed overseas continental U.S. (OCONUS), it is delivered to a 
seaport of embarkation (SPOE) for ship loading or an aerial port of embarkation (APOE) 
for military aircraft transportation.  If the system is deployed in CONUS, it is transported 
using commercial ground transportation.  Once delivered to the AO, the system is 
unpacked, set up and prepared to receive occupants.  A typical Base Camp requires 
approximately five to ten acres of land. Site preparation takes three to four days, with the 
entire camp fully operational in approximately seven days.  The chart below provides a 




Figure 3.   Force Provider Deployment Process Flow 
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5. Force Provider Accountability Requirements  
Army Regulation (AR 735-5) defines accountability as “the obligation of a person 
to keep records of property, documents, or funds. These records show identification data, 
gains, losses, dues-in, dues-out, and balances on hand or in use.”  The accountability 
requirement for FP is no different from any other piece of equipment that is classified as 
a major item and is assigned to a unit.  Once a unit receives the FP system, personnel are 
required to enter the item onto their organizational property records to conform to Army 
supply policy and regulations for asset management.  This record, known as the property 
book, serves as the accountability document for the unit and allows the Army to have 
TAV of all the systems assigned to the unit.  When accounting for FP, an organization 
uses the Line Item Number (LIN) format and National Stock Number (NSN) that was 
assigned for the FP system when it was developed, and enters the information into their 
Property Book Unit Supply Enterprise (PBUSE) database.  When the LIN and NSN are 
used to account for the end item system, the organizational unit is not required to account 
separately for all of the subcomponents that make up the FP system as individual entries 
to their property book record.  They are required, however, to maintain a component 
listing that identifies all items that come with the complete system for inventory and 
accountability purposes.  The requirement to document and maintain active 
accountability of the FP system remains in effect for the duration of operations and is 
maintained until the system is RESET.  The chart below identifies the current process 




Figure 4.   Force Provider Accountability Process 
 
6. Force Provider Ownership  
The FP Army War Reserve asset is deployed to specific AOs as determined by 
Army leadership through a combatant commander request process.  Army War reserve 
assets are owned by the Army G4 and are transferred to the control of AMC for depot 
storage and maintenance.  Upon deployment, the system becomes the responsibility of 
the requesting unit for accountability and operations purposes.  However, the Army G4 
continues to maintain oversight and provides all directives in terms of movement and use 
authorization.  While under the control of the combatant commander, the asset can be 
transferred to either a military organization or a civilian contractor who is charged with 
operating the system in support of a specific requirement.  Once the assets are no longer 
needed, the Army G4 provides redeployment guidance to the using unit and AMC for de-
processing and eventual return to CONUS to undergo RESET.  When the system enters 
RESET, the AMC becomes the responsible agent of the Army to manage and execute all 
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efforts to return the system back to full operational capability, including an ultimate end 
state of placing the item back into depot storage or preparing the system for follow-on 
missions.    
7. Force Provider De-processing  
The de-processing requirement is undertaken when the combatant commander 
makes a decision that the FP system is no longer required to support a given camp.  This 
could be a result of the camp being shut down or when a more permanent capability is 
planned to replace the temporary FP capabilities.  When the decision is made to remove 
FP, all assets are inventoried by a joint team (using organization, AMC and TAT team) 
and the components that are capable of being returned are re-packed into their containers 
and transported back to CONUS.  An inventory list is established, and all shortages are 
identified.  Identified shortages are submitted to AMC and the program office to begin 
the process of reprocuring missing components in preparation for RESET.   
8. Force Provider RESET  
RESET is defined as a set of actions to restore equipment to a level of combat 
capability commensurate with a unit’s future mission.  The three components of RESET 
are: 
•  Replacement: The purchase of new equipment to replace battle 
losses, worn out or obsolete equipment, and critical equipment 
deployed and left in theater, but needed for homeland defense, 
homeland security and other critical missions.  
• Recapitalization: A rebuild effort that extends the equipment’s 
useful life by returning it to a near “zero mile/zero hour” condition, 
either with the original performance specifications or with 
upgraded performance specifications.  
• Repair: A repair or overhaul effort that returns the equipment’s 
condition to the Army standard. It includes the Special Technical 
Inspection and Repair Program of aircraft.  
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In terms of FP, the primary efforts undertaken are the replacement and repair 
functions needed to return the system back to full operational capability.  When FP 
systems are returned by the user, an inventory is conducted at the RESET location and a 
determination is made regarding the cost and effort necessary to bring FP back to a 
complete system.  Once funded, actions are taken to return the system into a deployable 
state.  These efforts include reprocuring missing components and repairing any damaged 
components.  These functions take up to 16 months (depending on the level of effort 



























III.  DATA 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The data presented in this chapter documents the Army’s accountability guidance 
as it applies to the operational deployment of FP, tracing accountability from pre-
deployment through redeployment and FP RESET.  Financial implications resulting from 
the existing accountability processes and RESET requirements are also presented.  The 
responsibility to account for Army property is well documented in many Army 
Regulations (AR) and Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA PAM).   This chapter 
defines the various classification of Army property; defines the term System of Systems 
(SoS) and its relationship to FP; presents the relevant guidance on property accountability 
within the Army; describes the current accountability process used for FP in support of 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT); discusses financial liability due to loss; determines 
ownership of FP based on personal interviews and applicable guidance; and finally, 
identifies the costs associated with RESET of the FP system.  
B.   CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY 
The classification and rules associated with accounting for Army property are 
found in AR 710-21.  This AR identifies three distinct classifications of property types 
within the Army and provides guidance on the requirements necessary to account for 
each.  The three classifications types are expendable, durable, and non-expendable.  The 
level of asset visibility required for each type of item depends greatly on the purpose and 
cost of the item.  Below is a broader description of each property classification.  
 
                                                 
1 Army Regulation 710-2, Supply Policy Below the National Level, Chapter 2, March 28, 2008. 
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1. Expendable Items 
AR 735-52 defines this type of property as an item that is “consumed in use, or 
loses its identity in use. It includes items not consumed in use, with a unit cost of less 
than $300.”   Expendable items are, in essence, small-dollar procurements such as office 
supplies or one-time use systems that, due to their employment strategy, may cost more 
to recover and repair than to replace. An example of a one-time use item is a low-cost 
aerial delivery system designed to drop food and other products in support of 
humanitarian operations.  Though there is a cost established for procuring the system, 
there is no requirement to account for the item after it has been issued to the user because 
it will not be recovered to use again.  In this example, the item is considered a loss when 
it departs the aircraft to support the humanitarian mission.   
2. Durable Item 
AR 735-5 states that durable property is "property that is not consumed in use, 
does not require property book accountability, but because of its unique characteristics 
requires control when issued to the user." When accounting for durable items, 
organizations will use a hand receipt or hand receipt annex as a record to maintain 
visibility of the item.  Durable items have use beyond just a onetime effort.     In addition, 
these items could be considered highly desired and pilferable.  An example of a durable 
item is a tool.  Some tools may cost less than $100 to procure (such as a hand tool), but 
because of their potential for use beyond military application, they are required to have 
higher visibility in terms of accounting.   
3. Non-expendable Items 
Lastly, the non-expendable classification type items require the most robust 
accountability requirement. Nonexpendable property is not consumed in use and retains 
its original identity during the period of use.  Nonexpendable property requires formal 
accountability throughout the life of the item. These items will be accounted for at the 
unit level, using property book procedures identified in AR 710-2.  These items are 
                                                 
2 Army Regulation 735-5, Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability, Chapter 7, February 
28, 2005. 
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normally associated with high-dollar procurements that, from a valuation standpoint, 
require intense management and oversight.  An example of a non-expendable item would 
be a tank.  The reason for intense accounting of this type of system is the capability 
provided to the Army, in terms of firepower, to include the cost to the government to 
procure.  Non-expendable items are considered an investment to the Army, as opposed to 
an expense for items classified as expendable and durable.   In short, investments require 
continuous management and oversight at higher Army levels to maintain visibility — as 
contrasted with expensed items, which require only low-level oversight and 
documentation of the item procurement action. 
C.   SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS RELATIONSHIP TO FP 
The Chairman of the Joint Chief Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01F3 
defines a SoS as “a set or arrangement of interdependent systems that are related or 
connected to provide a given capability. The loss of any part of the system could 
significantly degrade the performance or capabilities of the whole.”  As discussed in the 
background section of this paper, the FP system is configured and deployed as a series of 
containers and major sub-systems that, when unpacked and erected at the desired 
location, provide the complete life-support capability for its intended user.  When major 
sub-components are removed from the system by operational commanders to support 
other missions, the ability of the system to provide the support it was designed for 
becomes degraded.   
D.   PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY GUIDANCE 
Accountability of property is an essential part of military operations.  If a unit 
cannot maintain visibility and oversight of issued equipment, the likelihood of the unit 
being prepared to conduct military operations is significantly hampered.   Units operating 
the FP system are no different in this respect.  Because of the myriad of components that 
make up the FP system, any loss, regardless of the component, places a burden on the  
 
                                                 
3 Chairman of the Joint Chief Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01F 1 May 2007. 
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financial resources of the Army for replacement of the lost items.  In terms of this paper, 
loss is considered the inability to accurately account for items by the person who is 
responsible for it.   
Accountability. The obligation imposed by law, lawful order, or 
regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping accurate 
records, to ensure control of property, documents or funds, with or without 
physical possession. The obligation, in this context, refers to the fiduciary 
duties, responsibilities, and obligations necessary for protecting the public 
interest; however, it does not necessarily impose personal liability upon an 
organization or person.4 
Property accountability rules are established within the Department of Defense 
(DoD) and apply to all branches of service.  Specifically, Department of Defense 
Instruction (DoDI) 5000.645 establishes the overarching guidance to the military 
departments with regard to accounting for property.  Expanding on the DoD guidance, 
each specific Service establishes their implementation regulations and procedures, 
conforming to the instructions from the DoD. 
Several regulations and pamphlets cover property accountability and asset 
management within the Army.  The primary regulation is AR 710-26.  This regulation 
provides the “policy for the accountability and assignment of responsibility for property 
issued to a unit.”  In addition, it serves as the overarching guidance for supply operations 
and applies to both peace and war operations.  To complement this regulation, the Army 
has established procedures for property accountability in AR 735-57.  This regulation 
provides detailed guidance on accountability procedures for property at all levels of the 
Army.  In addition, it provides commanders with a robust understanding of their 
responsibilities in terms of managing property within their organizations in order to 
conform to Army policy.  
                                                 
4 Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 7, Definitions, 
March 2007. 
5 Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.64, Accountability and Management of DoD-owned 
Equipment and Other Accountability Property, November 2, 2006. 
6 Army Regulation 710-2, Supply Policy Below the National Level, March 28, 2008. 
7 Army Regulation 735-5, Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability, February 28, 2005. 
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In times of war or emergencies, the Secretary of the Army prescribes the policy 
on wartime accountability for Army units.  These policies prescribe using unit property 
accounting requirements.  Though the majority of property accountability as defined in 
AR 710-2 remains in effect, the major change from peacetime is that only those records 
and files needed to give the commander current, authorized, and on-hand equipment 
status need be maintained.  In addition, the requirement for inspections and inventories 
ceases.  Based on the policy, inventories are only required in order to assess the 
availability and condition of the unit’s property, as opposed to peacetime inventories, 
which are conducted on a monthly and annual basis.  Maintaining accountability of 
assigned items is not changed, however, and neither is the requirement to report lost 
items.   
While all of the afore-mentioned guidance applies to FP, specific accountability 
guidance for the Force Provider (FP) system only appears in Field Manual (FM) 42-4248.  
This FM is the overarching document that provides Army organizations planning 
guidance, and an understanding of the mission capabilities and limitations of using FP.  
The manual addresses the general requirement to account for the property when the 
system is under the control of a unit or civilian contractor.   
E.  DEPLOYMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS 
1. Flow 
The FP accountability process was briefly discussed in the previous chapter.  The 
information on the process was extracted through personal interviews with members of 
the Product Manager Force Sustainment Systems (PM FSS) Technical Assistance Team 
(TAT) located in Natick, Massachusetts.  The PM FSS TAT is the field representative to 
the PM organization that supports the initial FP system set-up at the deployed location, 
and also conducts tri-annual, on-the-ground assessments of the systems.  The assessments 
are designed to assess FP system wear and tear from operational demands, and to 
provide valuable data to the PM FSS office and the Integrated Logistics Support  
 
                                                 
8 Field Manual 42-424, Quartermaster Force provider Company, August 6, 1999. 
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Center (ILSC).  Either the PM FSS office or the ILSC is charged with supporting the 
system while deployed.     Figure 5 provides an overview of the accountability process 
for FP in support of GWOT. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Accountability Process (GWOT) 
 
The deployment process begins when an operational command identifies a need 
for the FP system to the Army G3/4 through either an Operational Needs Statement 
(ONS) or Mission Needs Statement (MNS).   The Army G3 has the “Army General Staff 
responsibility for strategy formulation, overall force development, individual and unit 
training policy, the functional aspects of strategic and tactical command and control 
systems, nuclear and chemical matters, and establishing requirements and priorities for 
the employment and sustenance of Army forces.”9  The Army G4 is the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Logistics and “enhances Soldier logistics readiness by providing integrated 
policies and programs to maintain a ready Army that can be sustained in the joint 
operating environment.”10  
                                                 
9 Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 https://www.g357extranet.army.pentagon.mil/DCSExtranet/  
(Accessed 13 August 2008). 
1010 United States Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, U.S. Army Logistics 
http://www.hqda.army.mil/logweb/aboutus1.htm  (Accessed 13 August 2008). 
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Once FP employment is approved, either the PM FSS office or ILSC prepares the 
system for transportation to the required location.  The system will be sent directly from 
either the production facilities, RESET facilities, or storage to the SPOD or APOD 
(depending on how quickly the system needs to get to the location).  Once the system 
enters the transportation pipeline, accountability is transferred to the transportation 
agency through the use of shipping documents.  After delivery to the designated entry 
point in the area of operations (AO), accountability is transferred to the AO responsible 
agency (in this case, the Army Material Command representative). The agency loads the 
system information onto the Property Book Unit Supply Enterprise (PBUSE) and 
prepares the system for final movement from the entry point to the location where it will 
be set up and operated.   
Once at the final emplacement location where the system will be used by a 
military organization, a joint inventory is conducted between the TAT, user organization, 
and AMC representatives to account for the property and transfer authority from AMC to 
the using organization.  During the joint inventory, an inventory list is used to verify that 
all the components that make up FP are present.  If there is a discrepancy, between the 
inventory listing and the actual inventory, the shortages are identified and a report of 
discrepancy (ROD) is issued by the using organization.   The ROD is submitted to the 
AMC representatives and actions are undertaken to replace the missing components. 
Otherwise, the unit signs for the property short and notes the missing components.   
In situations where the system is to be operated by a contract service provider as 
part of the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the service provider 
conducts an inventory of the components with members of AMC. Once the camp is 
established, the service provider assumes responsibility for the system as part of their 
responsibilities under the contract.  In addition to assuming responsibility, the LOGCAP 
contractors are required to maintain the same accountability requirements as an Army 
unit would, while the systems are under their control. 
Under all scenarios, once the system is fully inventoried, it is recorded onto an 
accountability document maintained by the accepting organization.  The transfer of 
accountability is accomplished through a lateral transfer process in PBUSE, which is 
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designed to maintain asset visibility of the equipment under the control of either the unit 
or contractor.  Once in their control, standard property accountability rules defined in the 
AR and DA PAM related to supply policy apply. The owner of the property is 
responsible to adhere to these policies until they either transfer the system to another 
organization, or the system is returned for RESET.  In the case where the system is being 
returned, joint inventories are conducted between the FP owner and designated 
transporter as accountability is transferred to transportation entities and, eventually, to FP 
RESET authorities.  Owner, in terms of this paper, is defined as the responsible 
organization charged with maintaining supply accountability of the systems under their 
operational control. 
2. Transfer of Property Accountability in Uncommon Situations  
A Relief-in-Place – Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) is conducted when an 
organization that is supporting an operation is replaced by a new organization that 
assumes the ongoing mission and accountability of the FP assets.  As part of the sequence 
of events, a 100% physical inventory is conducted between the new and old organization 
to account for all items being transferred from one unit to another.   The inventory 
ensures that the equipment to be transferred is physically present prior to the new 
organization assuming responsibility for the items.  If the equipment is not present during 
the inventory, the shortages are identified and documented.  This shortage document 
serves as the input to possible investigations that may lead to the imposition of financial 
liability against the unit being replaced as a result of them losing accountability of 
assigned equipment.    
As depicted in Figure 6, there are two options for conducting a RIP-TOA for FP 
systems.  The first scenario is a transfer between military units.  This is the case when a 
unit charged with responsibility to operate and account for the system is to be replaced 
with another military unit that assumes that same mission.  In this case, the transfer of the 
FP system is executed between both organizations and discrepancies are identified and 
documented.  When the replacing organization is a LOGCAP contractor instead of a 
military unit, the inventory of equipment is conducted between the unit and the contractor 
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organization.  In addition to these two parties, the TAT team would also participate to 
ensure that all equipment that is required to support the mission is present. Inclusion of 
the TAT team precludes any contractual issues that could arise from the contractor not 
having all assets needed to support the mission specified in the contract.   
 
 
Figure 6.   RIP/TOA Process 
 
3. Organizational Challenges When Accounting for FP 
The largest challenge to FP system users is the necessity to account for the myriad 
of FP system components.  As described earlier in this chapter, the using unit or 
organization has a responsibility to account for items under their control.  As discussed in 
the background of this paper, however, FP has approximately 30,000 individual parts 
packed into a series of containers that are shipped to a using location.  The configuration 
of these containers is both end item sub-systems, including laundries, showers, kitchens 
and transportation containers that are packed with ancillary items needed to erect the total 
system.  Organizations receiving these containers are oftentimes unaware of what is 
inside each container; even though an inventory list is present, there is no organizational 
understanding on how to account effectively for these items.  Discussions with the PM 
FSS TAT, revealed that most of the units operating FP are unaware of their responsibility 
to maintain active accountability of all FP components.  They take the approach that as 
long as they have accounted for the item at the top level, they are, in essence, meeting the 
requirement of accountability.   
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Standard accountability practices require accountability of not only the main 
system, but also any sub-system and components that make up the main system.  The  FP 
design precludes individual classification for the majority of the sub-systems.  In 
addition, few users are familiar with these sub-systems or how to correctly add these 
items to their property book.  Many complex systems or System of Systems (SoS) 
develop and place a list of the systems components on a central Army database 
repository.  With the FP system, however, there is no such documentation.  As a result, 
an organization that is unfamiliar with FP finds it difficult to accurately account for all of 
the items in the system.    
Adding to the accountability challenge is the fact that many of the FP components 
are displaced from their initial operation location. At the direction of commanders, the 
components are moved to other camps within the AO.  Based on discussion with the 
TAT, this occurs when a specific FP capability, such as power generation, is no longer 
needed at the initial, authorized location.  When the equipment is moved, the unit 
originally responsible for the FP system transfers the accountability of those items to a 
new using organization.   When the Army makes a decision to return the FP system for 
RESET, the transferred items are rarely returned and the unit authorized the use of FP is 
forced to return an incomplete system back to the Army. 
4. Relevant Example of FP Accountability Issues 
In November 2004, the U.S. Army Audit Agency (AAA) conducted an audit on 
LOGCAP at the request of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command.11   
The audit was part of a greater, Army-wide effort related to asset management.  The audit 
focused on numerous LOGCAP functions undertaken in support of the GWOT. More 
specifically, it considered management of assets under the control of LOGCAP, which 
were used to perform their mission, as per the contract.   
The audit provided a somewhat eye-opening picture of LOGCAP’s asset 
management procedures and highlighted one of the major problems as being the 
                                                 
11 U.S. Army Audit Agency Audit report: A-2005-043-ALE (Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
in Kuwait). 
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management of FP assets.  In the document, the auditors found that “the Army lost full 
accountability over twelve FP modules worth about $75.6 million.” It also recommended 
that the Army needed to regain full accountability of these assets.    The document further 
identified that there were no joint inventories conducted that could have identified 
missing components and alleviated the loss of equipment.  Finally, recommendations 
were made by the AAA regarding the procedures that need to be incorporated into the 
statement of work dealing with responsibility and accountability of government 
equipment used by contractors. 
F.  PERTINENT INTERVIEWS AND GUIDANCE ON OWNERSHIP OF FP 
Members of the Army G4 and the AMC organizations responsible for overseeing 
FP held discussions in an attempt to obtain information on the ownership of the system 
when it is deployed to support contingency operations.  In addition, several written 
questions were provided to members of these organizations (Appendix) in order to 
understand the process of system deployment to include any relevant guidance that may 
be provided to units that receive the FP system.  The discussions revealed that there is no 
specific guidance provided to the using units, other than the Army’s approval to loan the 
systems in support of the request from the field.  In addition, it appears from the 
discussion that the operational commanders have significant flexibility to determine the 
employment and use of the FP system while it is under their control.    
In terms of property accountability of FP while deployed to support operations, 
discussions indicated that there is no specific written guidance that instructs organizations 
on what their responsibility will be while the system is under their control.  Discussions 
also revealed that standard Army property accountability rules are applicable, and those 
units should be familiar with the regulations that cover supply accountability. 
G. FINANCIAL LIABILITY 
The Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation prescribes the 
“requirements to investigate any Loss, Damage or Destruction (LDD) or government 
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property”12 and imposes, when applicable, financial liability on the individual or entity 
responsible for ensuring accountability of the property.  This regulation further specifies 
the requirement to the military services to establish policies and procedures regarding 
financial liability when there is an LDD of government property under their control.  
AR 735-5 and AR 710-2 provide a detailed process to be used in both peacetime 
and wartime operations when determining financial liability when there is LDD of Army 
property.  In both situations, when the accountability of an item under the care and 
responsibility of a military unit, individual or contractor is lost, a financial liability 
investigation is required.  The AR’s indicate that an investigation of the loss is required to 
occur within fifteen calendar days of discovering the discrepancy.   The purpose of this 
investigation is to gather facts to document the circumstances regarding the LDD of 
government property.  For military personnel, if the government investigation determines 
that negligence or misconduct was the driving factor in the LDD, financial liability may 
be imposed against the individual or entity responsible for the item.  The financial 
liability attempts to recoup the cost of the item that must now be replaced due to the loss.   
When the loss of Army property is attributed to a service contractor — who is 
required to maintain property accountability — the identification of loss will be forward 
to the contracting officer for remediation in accordance with Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR).  The contracting officer will be the individual responsible for 
conducting the investigation into the loss of equipment and will make a decision in terms 
of liability.  If the contracting officer determines that the loss requires compensation to 
the government, the contractor will be issued a formal letter identifying the decision and 
the demand for payment.  In this case, the contracting officer’s decision is final — unless 
the contractor disputes the findings and appeals under the disputes clause of the contract. 
H. RESET 
Discussions were held with the Natick ILSC RESET Team to obtain information 
on efforts undertaken to RESET the FP system back to full operational capability once 
they are returned from their deployment location.  Discussions attempted to gain: an 
                                                 
12 Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation. 
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understanding of the challenges to the RESET program due to: equipment not being 
returned; the number of FP systems that have been RESET to date; the corresponding 
costs to RESET the FP system since the program began; the average number of systems 
available for use; and the average time necessary to RESET an FP system in order to be 
prepared to deploy again. 
1.  Challenges to the RESET Program 
In 2005, the ILSC RESET Team began efforts to RESET FP systems that had 
been deployed in support of OIF/OEF.  The base assumption used by the ILSC RESET 
Team at the time was that all major components deployed as part of an FP system would 
return when the Army made a decision to redeploy assets from an operational theater.  
This assumption was used to estimate the expense of bringing an FP system back to an 
operational state so it can be prepared for follow-on missions.   The same assumption is 
used today for all modules still deployed in support of operations.   
Though the assumptions appeared reasonable at the time, history has shown that 
the systems are often returned with a significant number of components missing. These 
components need to be replaced in order to bring the system back to the intended end 
state.  One of the challenges to the program is that no two systems are ever returned with 
the same equipment missing.  Because of the unique design of FP, and the myriad of 
components that make up the system, attempting to establish a baseline RESET cost is 
difficult at best.  Compounding the issue is that only so many dollars are available in a 
given year to conduct these types of RESET efforts.  For those items not returned from 
their deployed location, reprocurement actions must be undertaken to repurchase the 
components in order to complete the system.  Costs above the forecasted budget 
(projected at $7.1M per module) cause an immediate, unfunded requirement to the Army 
and affects the ability of the RESET Team to turn the system around quickly.   
2. Number of Force Provider Modules Reset  
Since 2005, nineteen FP systems have undergone some type of RESET effort to 
prepare for follow-on missions.  All of these systems have been redeployed to locations 
around the world and are still in use today.   In speaking with the ILSC, it is anticipated 
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that there will be an annual requirement to RESET at least two FP systems per year for 
the near future.  This prediction is based on the number of systems currently deployed 
(approximately thirty) and others that are either in storage or in the process of being 
procured.  The total Army objective is fifty-three systems, although this number could 
increase or decrease depending on available funding and items that are considered 
washouts.  A washout, in this case, is when the cost to RESET the system exceeds 65% 
of the total procurement cost for a typical FP system (at present, $7.1M).    
3. RESET Expenditures  
This information is based on interview with the ILSC Reset Team Leader.  The 
difference in per module price was due to numerous factors to include the condition of 
the modules returned from Theater, possible configuration changes, price changes on 
parts, and labor increases at Letterkenney Army Depot (one of the locations that conducts 
the RESET function). 
 2005:  2 Modules @ $3.9M = Total $7.8M 
 2006:  7 Modules @ $4.3M = Total $4.3M 
 2007:  4 Modules @ $5.5M = Total $22M 
 2008:  6 Modules @ $7.1M = Total $42.6M 
4. RESET Budget Increases 
Budget planning for RESET managers is difficult because no two systems are 
returned in the same condition due to the use and environments in which they were 
operated.  According to the ILSC Reset Team Leader, the cost of items required to be 
reprocured can increase by 40 to 50 percent over what was initially spent to procure the 
item.  In addition, the fact that the more expensive components are anticipated to be 
returned for RESET, the requirement to replace these items results in an increase to the 
projected budget.  The following table is a depiction of some of the components that were 
not returned for a single module currently undergoing RESET.  The information was 
obtained from the ILSC RESET Team and is used as an example of requirements to 
reprocure assets to restore an FP system back to full operational capability: 
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Nomenclature # Required # Returned # Missing % Loss  
Environmental Control Units 56 42 14 25 
Generators 26 6 20 80 
Latrines 8 5 3 40 
Showers  8 5 3 40 
Kitchens 4 3 1 25 
Laundry 4 3 1 25 
Table 1.   Table 1 Missing FP Components 
The following table represents the increased FP component costs13 to the RESET 
program, comparing typical RESET cost with reprocurement cost.   
Nomenclature Reset Cost New Procurement Increase 
Environmental Control Units $99,120 $165,200 $66,080 
Generators 348,700 $581,220 $232,520 
Latrines $108,000 $180,000 $72,000 
Showers  $117,000 $195,000 $78,000 
Kitchens $54,000 $90,000 $36,000 
Laundry $48,000 $80,000 $32,000 
    
Total Increase    $516,600 
Table 2.   RESET Cost Growth 
 
What is depicted in the above tables is only a portion of the items that are not 
returned from the deployed location.  Based on discussions with the ILSC RESET Team, 
other items not returned often result in a 25-50% increase to the total planned RESET 
budget, which is estimated to be $7.1M.   
5. Average Number of FP Systems Available for Deployment at Any 
Given Time (Quarterly Basis) 
Information is based on an interview with the ILSC FP Reset Liaison as well as 
historical RESET reports.  These numbers do not reflect six Force Provider Modules (in 
                                                 
13 RESET cost figures were provided by the ILSC RESET Team and were calculated using a 
conservative estimate of 60% of the new procurement cost.   
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older configuration) located in Army Prepositioned Stock, which Army G3 and G4 have 
reserved for future contingencies and are not available for current operations.   
 
 3Q/FY06:  3 Modules 
 4Q/FY06:  1 Module 
 1Q/FY07:  3 Modules 
 3Q/FY07:  0 Modules 
 4Q/FY07:  3 Modules 
 1Q/FY08:  3 Modules 
 2Q/FY08:  3 Modules 
 4Q/FY08:  5 Modules 
 
The non-availability of modules in 3Q/FY07 is a direct reflection of the impact 
the troop surge had on levels of inventory.  A total of nine (600-man) modules and a 150- 
man module prototype Force Providers were used to support this surge in OEF/OIF.  
6. Average Time Required to RESET an FP System 
The time required to RESET an FP system varies depending on what the system 
looks like when it returns from deployment and what the shortages are determined to be 
after the items are inventoried.  In a perfect scenario where all items are returned 
(uncommon), the anticipated time to return a system back to the Army is approximately 
six to nine months.  In those cases where items have to be reprocured, the time can 
increase to six to twelve months and maybe longer.  The reason for the increase in time is 
due to having to reprocure the components that are not standard Army items.  Since no 
production line exists for these items, the time necessary to contract for and manufacture 
the items often results in a slip in schedule.   
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IV.  ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter is subdivided into two parts; Part I: Analysis of FP data and Part II: 
Conclusions and Recommendations based on the information presented throughout the 
paper.  To assist the reader, an introduction paragraph is provided at the beginning of 
each section, covering the scope of information that is discussed within the specific part 
of the chapter.  At the end of both the analysis and conclusion parts, a brief summary is 
provided to include recommended areas for further study.  
A. PART I: ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
This section is intended to provide an analysis of the research data regarding the 
FP system and the challenges faced in accounting for the system when it is deployed to 
support operations.  The information in this section concentrates on whether FP is a SoS; 
whether current property guidance is effective in maintaining accountability of the FP 
system; whether there are gaps in the deployment accountability process; the ownership 
of FP when deployed; whether the current operational guidance provides the user with 
sufficient information to manage FP; the financial liability impacts to the Army; and 
whether FP RESET costs can be minimized. 
2. FP as a System of Systems 
The definition of a SoS was discussed briefly in the data chapter.  Though the 
definition was extracted from a single source, the basic tenet applies to many other 
definitions relative to SoS.  The main point gleaned is that, in order to be considered a 
SoS, there must be a significant performance degradation of system capabilities if there is 
a loss of any part of the system.   In the case of FP, parts of the SoS definition are 
applicable because any loss of the major sub-components degrades the capability of the 
whole system to perform its intended mission of providing full-scale life support 
capability to the user.   
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Unlike other major complex systems (such as tank or communications platforms 
that rely heavily on the integration and operation of the separate components in order to 
provide a specific end state capability), the FP system is designed as a robust set of 
capabilities that can be added to, or removed, and still provide some, but not all, 
functional capabilities to the user.  The fundamental problem with attempting to define 
FP as a true SoS is that there have been instances where the FP system has been deployed 
in functional segments, based on the user’s mission demands.  On other occasions, certain 
major sub-components (showers, laundry, billeting and power generation) that make up 
the higher level system, have been displaced from the deployed AO and operated at 
locations away from the main system set.  Though this type of event is generally the 
exception rather than the rule, the loss of the components did not result in a major 
disruption of services.   
Another point to be drawn is that the basic design of the FP system is as a 
temporary asset to provide capabilities at a given location until more permanent facilities 
can be built.  As a camp is being established, the FP system provides a valuable 
capability in that all the life-support requirements for the user arrive at one time.  After 
the FP is placed into full operations, certain FP functions will be replaced when a more 
permanent infrastructure is built.  When the sub-systems that provide these functions are 
no longer required, they are either packed back into their shipping containers or moved 
by operational commanders to locations that require those specific assets. 
The analysis conducted on the FP design and mission intent validate that 
degradation of specific functions is inherent to the design and does not significantly 
impact the ability of FP to perform a required mission.   As such, the literal use of SoS to 
define the FP system is not necessarily accurate.  A more appropriate definition would be 




3. Property Accountability Guidance 
A review of the applicable guidance on property accountability within the Army 
concluded that property accountability guidance is clearly articulated in numerous 
documents and regulations published within the DoD.  More specifically, the Army has 
two overarching regulations (AR 710-2 and AR 735-5) that provide property users with 
the requirements to maintain asset visibility and accountability of equipment assigned to 
their organization.   
Every organization within the Army has the same inherent responsibility to 
account for and manage property under their control, regardless of whether they are 
authorized a piece of equipment or not.  The rules for accounting for the FP system are no 
different.  Even though no organization is truly “authorized” an FP system due to its 
designation as a temporary-need, wartime asset, the fact that the equipment is loaned to a 
specific organization provides that unit with the authorization and, therefore, the 
responsibility to account for the item.   
The broader challenge to the using organization is related to the effectiveness of 
accounting for the system and the myriad of components that make up the system.  
Property accountability rules require the item to be placed on the organization’s property 
records and controls to be established that would maintain asset visibility of all the items 
that make up FP.  Unfortunately, units that are permitted to use the FP system have never 
been responsible for accounting for anything like the FP system.  In addition, the 
guidelines associated with property accountability do not specifically address the 
requirements to account for this type of reconfigurable asset in total.  
What is clear from relevant discussion with the PM FSS TAT is that 
accountability of the FP system is not conducted in the same way at all user locations.  
Some locations simply list the system on their property book at the top level; others break 
down the system into major components and list these separately on their property book.  
In either case, property accountability continues to be a challenge. The lack of specific 
guidance on how a unit should capture the system, in terms of accountability, needs to be 
better defined. 
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4. Ownership and Guidance on FP 
In discussions with representatives of the Army G4 and AMC, it was identified 
that FP is “owned” by the Army G4 as a war reserve asset and managed by AMC.  
During the production process, PM Force Sustainment Systems is responsible for 
delivering the system to either Army prepositioned stock or to a user, based on Army 
directives.  Once the system is approved for use, based on an ONS/MNS, and arrives at 
an operational location, the unit or organization authorized to use the system becomes the 
“owner” during the time specified in the approval documentation.  It was noted that the 
great majority of organizations that use FP are not authorized the system to be part of 
their organizational equipment.  To these units, the FP system is “loaned” from the Army 
for the duration of time approved in the ONS/MNS.  It was indicated that, once approved, 
the using organization has the flexibility to employ the FP system as they deem 
appropriate to perform their required mission.   
In the approval to loan the FP asset, it appears as though the written guidance the 
Army provides to the using organization only specifies the approval timeline.  In 
addition, the approval provides directives to AMC to prepare and ship the system to the 
desired location.  The instructions apparently do not provide any specific guidance on the 
responsibility and requirements to maintain accountability for FP. Neither do they 
provide specific instructions on what should occur if the organizations decide to break the 
system apart and use components of FP at locations other than those approved in the 
ONS/MNS.  
Due to the lack of specific guidance on the use and accountability of FP, and the 
fact that the system is often approved by the Army for use by organizations that have 
never had any experience with using the FP system, the challenges associated with 
accounting for FP by using units are magnified.  Though the argument could be presented 
that standard property accountability rules apply, the fact that accountability challenges 
have been occurring with the FP system (such as items not being returned to undergo 
RESET) validates that a more structured protocol is needed to provide the gaining units 
with the expectations of the Army in terms of accountability and return of this system. 
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5. Accountability Process Flow 
a. Normal Flow of Equipment 
The accountability flow for FP was discussed in section E of the data 
chapter.   The information was obtained through discussions with the FP TAT, and Figure 
6 of the same chapter depicts how the FP system moves from the PM/ILSC to the using 
organization.  Though the process appears smooth on the surface, there are some gaps in 
both inventory and accountability as the system moves through the process.  Supply 
policy regulations require continuous accountability of equipment as it moves from 
organization to organization.  Figure 7 identifies where these gaps appear in terms of the 
process.   
 
Figure 7.   Process Flow Gap 
FP systems are shipped to the user location through either land, sea, or air. 
Once the system is transferred to the transportation agency, there is a responsibility on 
the part of the PM/ILSC to provide shipping documents to the agency so accountability 
can be established.  In this case, the shipping document becomes the accountability 
record while the FP is in transit.  In terms of responsibility, the transportation agency 
assumes responsibility for the FP system while in transit, and transfers responsibility 
when the system arrives at its designated entry point. 
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Once at the entry point, and prior to AMC entering the system onto the 
PBUSE database, an inventory is required to validate that all the components are present 
prior to accepting responsibility of the system from the transportation agency.  Accepting 
responsibility for the FP system without validation (inventory), will result in the gaining 
organization assuming all liability for the components that fall under FP.  If shortages are 
subsequently identified after assuming responsibility, it will be difficult to establish 
where the loss occurred, and the organization that accepted responsibility would most 
likely be held responsible for the loss. 
As the FP system is transferred within the AO to the final destination 
where it will be operated, by either a unit or contractor, the shipping documents once 
again become the accountability record.  As was the case with liability when the system 
was shipped from CONUS, the transportation agency assumes accountability of the 
system until it is transferred to the gaining organization.  Once at the location, the 
receiving unit conducts an inventory and identifies shortages.  From that point forward, 
the using unit establishes operations of the FP system and has the inherent responsibility 
to maintain accountability of the system until it is either transferred to another 
organization or repacked to be returned to CONUS for RESET. 
b. RIP/TOA 
When a RIP/TOA is conducted, the process flow identified in Figure 7 of 
the data chapter also has some gaps.  These gaps are identified in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.   RIP/TOA Gap 
Figure 8 identifies that when a RIP/TOA is to be conducted, the owning 
organization (in this case, the unit that will be transferring FP) should conduct an 
inventory to determine if there are any shortages or loss of major items prior to 
transferring the system.  These shortages should be noted on a shortage document and, if 
the shortages are due to loss (some shortages may be due to the items being classified as 
expendable), the loss of the major items must be investigated and financial liability 
determined.  Once the system is transferred to the gaining unit, the gaining unit assumes 
responsibility and accountability for the FP system, minus those items that have been 
identified as a loss.  At the end of the process, the shortage document and a list of the 
items that were lost will be sent to the PM/ILSC for remediation.  Those agencies will 
consult with the Army G4 and AMC who will make a determination on whether to re-
ship items to fill the shortages or to document that the lost items will not be returned 
when the specific system redeploys to undergo RESET 
6. Financial Liability 
Indentifying the circumstances that led to a loss, damage or destruction of 
government property either through a lack of accountability or negligence, is a 
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requirement prescribed in the DoD Financial Management Regulation.14   This same 
requirement is further outlined in the Army property accountability regulations.  In the 
case of the FP system, attempts were made to obtain historical data on instances where 
financial liability was imposed on a unit or contractor who lost items that were part of the 
system.  Unfortunately, no data was available that would indicate that the required 
investigations were ever conducted, or that liability has ever been imposed against any FP 
user organization.   
When discussing RESET efforts with members of the PM office and Natick 
ILSC, it was verified that there have been numerous occasions where major components 
that make up the FP system were never returned by the user.  In addition, it was further 
identified that those systems that were not returned had to be reprocured by the Army in 
order to make the FP system whole as it was reconstituted through the stages of RESET.   
What can be drawn from these discussions is that there was either a decision made by 
operational commanders to continue to use FP assets to perform missions outside the 
original loan authorization provided by the Army or, there was a loss of accountability of 
these systems and, as a result, the systems could not be returned.  
In either case, an investigation should have been conducted in an attempt to 
determine why the components were never returned.  If an investigation revealed that the 
systems were still required to perform a mission, a request should have been submitted to 
the Army G4 by the using unit to retain the items.  If the investigation resulted in a 
finding that the systems were lost, the last organization responsible for the FP system 
prior to it being shipped back for RESET should have been held liable for the loss and the 
resulting costs to reprocure the missing components. 
7. Reset Analysis 
Lack of accountability of FP components while deployed leads to numerous 
challenges. These include the inability to perform the FP mission while deployed; the 
availability of systems to support new contingencies or to further support ongoing 
                                                 
14 Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 7, March 2007. 
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operations; and budget shortfalls to RESET planners when components not returned for 
RESET must be reprocured due to the loss or accountability lapses noted earlier. 
a. Mission Capability 
As with any military equipment, soldiers and units are impacted to some 
extent by the availability of equipment, whether weapons, vehicles, night optical devices, 
etc.  FP is not an exception.  While difficult to determine when the system is non-mission 
capable, it is clearly evident that if critical components are either not available or are 
missing, the soldiers well being will be impacted.  The ILSC RESET Team, along with 
the PM FSS TAT, created a readiness matrix as an enclosure to a Memorandum of 
Agreement between PM FSS and the Natick ILSC.  This matrix (Attachment A) shows 
objective, threshold, and non-mission capable parameters for a given component within 
the FP system.  It is clear that not accounting for and, in essence, losing components of 
deployed assets can quickly and negatively impact a system’s capability to provide life-
support functions to the soldiers that depend on the FP system.   
b. Availability of Modules 
As identified in the data section, the turnaround time to complete a 
RESET of an FP system and return it to inventory stock is impacted by the number of 
components received back from the deployment area.  When components that are 
planned to be RESET are not returned, these assets must be reprocured, increasing the 
time to RESET by as much as three months (a 25 percent increase).  As shown in the data 
section, there have been instances where limited systems are available in times of need, 
as the surge of 2007 demonstrated.  The fact that no systems were available for any new 
contingency or other ongoing operations, required the Army to fund two new 
procurements of FP ,which obviously required a larger expense. 
c. RESET Budget Increases 
Identified in Table 1 and Table 2 of the data chapter are the FP items 
historically not returned for RESET, either because the responsible organization lost 
them, or an operational commander decided to keep them.  In addition, the tables show 
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the costs associated with having to reprocure these components to make the system whole 
again.  What is apparent is that the loss of asset accountability, or decisions by 
operational commanders to not return FP components, result in a larger, and arguably 
needless, financial cost to the RESET program for reconstituting FP assets to be 
redeployed.  
B. PART II: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Introduction 
This section provides conclusions drawn after careful study of the accountability 
process required for, and undertaken by, units charged with using and accounting for the 
FP system.  The study encompassed two functions: 1) Review of all pertinent data on the 
FP system design, mission and use, 2) Analysis of the current accountability process used 
for FP throughout the deployment cycle and consequences resulting from loss of 
accountability. The conclusions are discussed with regard to the research questions that 
were posed earlier in this Joint Applied Project.  
a. Primary Question 
What are the U.S. Army property accountability rules and procedures 
concerning the Force Provider System, and how is accountability guidance 
communicated and carried out among FP-using organizations?    Addressing these issues 
required dissecting the question into three pertinent parts.  Each part was unique and 
required enough data and analysis to support a sound conclusion.  The three parts of the 
question, with conclusions for each, are provided below. 
(1). What are the property rules for accounting for Army 
property?  Research and analysis of relevant material results in the conclusion that 
property accountability rules have been established and published to provide 
organizations and users throughout the Army with a step-by-step process to account for 
any item that has value to the government.  The basic rule extracted from these 
documents is that all property (regardless of type) procured to meet an intended mission 
or use must be accounted for on some form of accountability document.  This document 
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(hand receipt or database) serves in essence as the paper trail. From initial production or 
receipt of an item, it follows the item through transfer from one entity to another and 
eventually to disposal and removal from the Army inventory.   
(2). Communication of accountability guidance.  The 
overarching theme derived from data obtained — from past articles and discussions with 
personnel who have deployed into theater to support the FP system — is that there clearly 
appears to be a gap between what is required to be done, and what is actually occurring in 
terms of accounting for the FP system during deployments.  From the aspect of whether 
accountability guidance is communicated, the answer is both yes and no:  Yes to the fact 
that Army accountability rules and guidance rules are in place, and that they require 
organizations to account for all Army property;  No to the fact that specific instructions 
on how to account for the FP system — from arrival in theater to ultimate return to stocks 
— are not provided at the time the system is authorized for use.  The largest challenge 
appears to be that users in the field consider FP as a conglomeration of pieces and parts. 
Their knowledge of accounting for a system like this is minimal, at best.  Standard 
accountability practices require accountability of not only the major system but also the 
components that make up the system.  The challenge to the FP user is that the 
components of FP are listed only on an inventory list and are not found on any 
component listing tied to the system as a whole.  In addition, unlike other complex 
systems that place their component listings on a central database repository for access by 
authorized users of the items, there is no such documentation for the FP system.  As a 
result, the ability to account for all of the items that make up the system is difficult.  What 
is certain is that most of the accountability issues surrounding FP can be traced to the lack 
of instruction provided when the system is authorized for release by the Army G4.  When 
a system is deployed to support a specific contingency operation, the authorization to 
release the system does not provide instruction to the using command on how they should 
account for and track the system components.  Nor are there instructions provided to 
gaining commanders that limit or restrict their authority to retain and re-purpose FP 
components beyond the original loan terms. 
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(3). Compliance to accountability rules.  In addition to the lack 
of guidance, the system configuration of the FP system may pose an inherent challenge to 
units required to account for the system.  This is due to the composition of the system and 
the fact that the major components that comprise FP are not individually accounted for 
per se.  When an organization receives the FP system, it receives a myriad of containers 
that make up the system; these are considered as one entity for accountability purposes.  
Consequently, these FP component containers have no individual identity to the user, and 
the receiving organization is forced to account for the system at the top-level 
configuration.  This configuration does not easily lend itself to be further subdivided 
other than to use the NSN for the major systems.  This could be due to the components 
not having a standard LIN that would allow easy entry onto a property book account. 
Though some of the users take it upon themselves to build 
component lists for the FP system in order to ease accountability and inventory 
requirements, this does not appear to be the standard practice.  What appears to be 
common, based on discussions with the PM FSS TAT, is that some organizations are 
entering the FP system onto their property book only at the top level system and using 
this entry to validate that they have accountability for the asset. This process provides the 
opportunity to manipulate the accountability process and occurs because there is no 
singular directive that provides users with the guidance necessary to account for the 
system at a lower, component level.  When it comes to visibility at the higher level, it 
appears as though accounting for FP as a top-level system is an acceptable approach.  
However, this approach only lends credibility to the challenges associated with 
maintaining total asset visibility of the FP systems. Also, it can easily translate into a 
significant cost burden to the Army when having to replace components that are missing 
upon return to undergo RESET.  Because the system is not managed below the FP system 
(top) level, there also appears to be no financial liability imposed to those units or 
organizations that lose accountability of the components that make up the FP system. 
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b.  Subsidiary Questions 
(1). To what extent is Force Provider (FP) a system of systems 
(SoS), and how effective are accountability procedures in terms of accomplishing 
accountability goals and adapting to changing environmental factors?  The Chairman 
of the Joint Chief Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01F dated May 1, 2007, 
defines a SoS as “a set or arrangement of interdependent systems that are related or 
connected to provide a given capability.  The loss of any part of the system could 
significantly degrade the performance or capabilities of the whole.”15 One could argue 
that the SoS definition is applicable to FP because of the way the FP is constructed and 
deployed as a series of containers that, when connected together, provides complete 
functionality for its intended user.  The most relevant point in considering FP as a SoS is 
the impact to the system when major FP subcomponents are removed.  Some 
functionality continues to provide a benefit to the occupants; however, the degradation of 
services that can be provided in an otherwise complete system could be considered a 
detriment to the overall mission performance and effectiveness of FP.  Considering this 
impact to FP as the sole validation that it is a SoS, however, is not sufficient in the 
broader picture.  There have been times when FP was deployed to support operations, but 
not all of the major components were used in support of the mission.  This is because the 
FP system can be deployed to a myriad of locations that may already have infrastructure 
capabilities capable of providing functionality that is part of FP.  Though this is more of 
an exception than a rule, the fact that the system is not dependent on each of the major 
components to perform relevant missions would preclude it from being defined as an 
actual SoS. 
In terms of effective accountability of the FP system when 
deployed, there appears to be an inconsistent approach based on where the system is 
deployed and who is responsible for the accountability of the system (units or contracted 
service providers).  What is clear is that a significant number of systems have been 
deployed in support of operations since 2002, and the effectiveness of the processes in 
                                                 
15 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. 
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place to account for all of the items components of the system is wanting.  This is 
validated by the 2004 AAA audit that determined that the Army lost full accountability of 
twelve FP systems worth in excess of $75M.  In addition, there is a continued increase in 
the cost to RESET the system due to the need to procure assets that are not returned.  One 
reason for the cost increase could be attributed to equipment that is in disrepair; it is more 
cost effective to reprocure new components than attempt to repair old ones.  However, 
this is more of an exception.  More typically, the using unit is not returning assets due to 
loss of accountability or, making a formal decision to retain selected FP components for 
missions outside of the loan agreement.  Either way, this poses a substantial problem to 
the Army.   
(2). How does not accounting for FP items at the component 
level affect the FP system?  Force Provider has numerous components that need to be 
accounted for in order to maintain the integrity of the system from an asset visibility 
standpoint. What has been concluded from the data and analysis related to the 
accountability of FP is that the current way of doing business is ineffective.  Because 
most units that receive the FP system account for the item only at the top system level, 
they oftentimes lose sight of the fact that the components are a critical piece of the system 
that may be needed in other operations.  The level of oversight of these components is not 
as robust as it could be.  Not accounting for the FP system at the component level results 
in a greater likelihood of these items being removed from their location and moved to 
other areas.  When this occurs, the system’s ability to provide its intended capabilities is 
greatly hampered.  In addition, the loss of these components to support other missions 
causes a significant challenge for the Army (both operationally and financially) when a 
decision is made to redeploy the system or send it back to undergo RESET.  The 
operational impact comes from the inability to move the complete system to another user 
organization that has established a priority need for it.  The financial impact results from 
having to reprocure assets that were removed without proper authorization and the 
resulting loss of accountability. 
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(3). How is FP ownership described and operationalized? 
There is no clear guidance on ownership of the FP system.  What is known is that the 
system is produced by a singular product office.  Once produced, the system is 
transferred to either storage or to an operational location based on the Army G4 directive.  
If placed into storage, the responsible agent for maintaining the integrity of the system 
(accountability and maintenance) is the Army Materiel Command (AMC).  If the system 
is deployed to support a specific operation, the organization that received approval by the 
Army G4 to use the FP system becomes the owner of the item and, by DoD and Army 
guidance, accountable.  Unfortunately, the lines of authority and decision making become 
unclear.  Organizations using the FP system believe that they have the authority to 
redeploy assets as they deem appropriate in order to satisfy their mission need.  AMC 
believes that they have the responsibility to manage the systems when they are deployed 
(especially when a contractor is charged with operating the system) and are the 
responsible agents to ensure that the system integrity is maintained.  In either case, what 
is evident is that formal guidance and policy should be established by the authorizing 
organization (Army G4) to provide the using organizations information on what they can 
and cannot do with the systems under their operational control 
(4). What is the impact of losing FP components to operational 
commanders?  The impact of losing components comes in two forms: increased 
reprocurement costs of the items that are lost to commanders, and a lack of the Army’s 
ability to quickly redeploy a module in RESET due to the lead time necessary to 
reprocure items.  Both of these impacts result from either a loss of accountability at the 
user level or a decision by operational commanders to retain FP components.  The 
reprocurement costs are those necessary to obtain a replacement component that has not 
been returned, regardless of directives provided to return the system to RESET.  These 
are typically unplanned costs because the base assumption is that all components will be 
returned to Army management when a decision is made that the FP systems are no longer 
necessary to support a specific operation.  These costs are fluid and depend on how well a 
system is managed and accounted for throughout the deployment, operational use, and 
redeployment cycle.  When total accountability is maintained by the user, the data 
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indicates that these costs are typically low.  When accountability is not enforced, these 
costs have the potential to increase substantially.  The Army has established a base cost to 
RESET and FP system at $7.1M.  These costs consider the historical efforts necessary to 
bring a typical system to full operational capability.  This cost does not include 
reprocurement costs for lost components or those that have been retained beyond the loan 
agreement.   
The Army’s ability to quickly redeploy FP systems from RESET is 
hampered when these systems do not return from deployments with all of their 
components.  The data indicates that, for those systems that have all assets returned for 
RESET, the turnaround time is approximately nine months from the time the system is 
received at the RESET site.  For those FP systems that require components to be 
reprocured, the RESET schedule may be lengthened up to eighteen months, depending on 
the lead time necessary to obtain the items.  Because there are only so many FP systems 
available to be deployed at a given time, any delays in getting the system out of RESET 
places a burden on the organizations that need the system to effectively conduct 
operations. 
(5). How are FP utilization decisions described and 
operationalized when deployed?  The research shows that no clear guidance is provided 
by the Army to organizations approved to receive an FP system to meet their operational 
needs.  It appears that when the authorizing agency releases the FP system from either 
storage or production, their interaction with the gaining command ceases until either the 
gaining command or the authorizing agency requests that the system to be returned.   As 
a result, the decision to move assets of FP from one location to another is solely at the 
discretion of the using organization.   
c. Recommendations 
Improvements must be implemented with regard to the accountability of 
the FP system when deployed in support of operations.  In an effort to prevent some of 
the ongoing accountability challenges the Army faces when systems are deployed, the 
following two recommendations are made: 
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(1). When an FP system is approved to be deployed in support 
of an operation or mission, clear guidance needs to be provided to the gaining 
organization on the requirements to account for the entire system (to include major 
subcomponents).  In addition, whenever a system is received by a using organization, all 
components should be identified and added to the lateral transfer documentation that 
transfers accountability from storage or production to the using organization.  This lateral 
transfer documentation should be signed by the gaining unit and a copy maintained at the 
approval source.  Lastly, whenever a component is to be removed from the FP system in 
order to be used at another location, information should be sent to the approving 
organization and the component should be placed on a hand receipt from the original user 
to ensure accountability.  This process will allow for significantly improved 
accountability and will ensure that financial liability is imposed to the proper 
organization in the event the system is either lost or destroyed.   
(2). The configuration of the FP system should consider an 
approach that breaks out the major components of FP and makes each an 
independent, separately accountable system.  The ability to account for the items as 
independent systems forces a higher level of accountability since these components 
would most likely be classified as a major item.  The current process of considering these 
systems as components of FP places a significant burden on using organizations that are 
not necessarily familiar with the significant number of components and equipment 
comprising an FP system. In addition to making these systems stand-alone items, efforts 
should be undertaken to build an Army-approved component listing that will be 
forwarded to the gaining unit so that these components can be placed onto the unit’s 
property book to ensure better accountability in the future.   
3. Summary 
The challenges faced by the Army when attempting to account for the Force 
Provider System when deployed in support of an operation are not new.  What is clear is 
from the findings in this paper is that in order to facilitate improvements to the FP 
accountability process, clear written guidance must be established and provided to those 
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organizations responsible for using the deployed system.  Though processes and 
procedures relative to accounting for Army property are clearly documented in numerous 
regulations, adherence to these procedures must be mandated at all levels of command.  
Without command oversight and involvement in the FP accountability efforts, the 
challenges faced today will undoubtedly continue.  
4. Areas for Further Research  
Though this project examined the accountability challenges related to the FP 
system, there are other areas that could be considered for further study.   
First, one of the areas that was outside the scope of this research is an analysis of 
the force structure needed to support an FP system and whether organizations should be 
charged and resourced with the sole mission of deploying, operating, and accounting for 
the FP system. Having a singular responsible organization that deploys and returns with 
the system after operational use allows for a greater likelihood that the system will be 
accounted for and visibility of all the components maintained.   
Second, though financial impacts were addressed in this paper and were 
specifically focused on RESET cost growth, a more in-depth analysis on the total 
ownership cost of the FP system (production costs through RESET) should be 
undertaken.  This type of analysis may provide the Army with a better picture of the 
financial requirements needed to resource the total procurement objective and determine 
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